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Abstract
This study analyses the factors affecting investment decisions concerning end-user support
(EUS), which is even more complex than that of centralised data processing (DP). The
alternatives of proactive and reactive end-user support (EUS) in a modern LAN environment
are compared by analysing the failure risk of one specific component (HUB) of the LAN. The
additional preventive actions and management costs are considered as well. Both proactive
and  reactive EUS are analysed in terms of investment and risk management. Arguments for
and against enhanced support capability and a fault tolerant system structure are sought for
optimising risk/spending levels. The reliability theory with its demand patterns demonstrated
by electronic components has been used in the spirit of inventory-production theory in order
to quantify the risk both with deterministic and random failure intensity parameters.
Exact Bayesian tests have been developed in order to evaluate the two vendor MTBF figures,
only the first of which turns out to match the observation. Bayesian posterior failure distribu-
tions have been estimated both in the deterministic and random failure intensity cases, the last
of which results in a binomial distribution with an annual mean of 16 HUBs and a standard
deviation of 4 HUBs. The cost parameters estimated by NOKIA from the field have been
used, and the costs of alternative policies have been assessed.
The annual expected reactive cost, with a lower hourly developer cost option of kFIM 563,
exceeds the annual proactive cost of kFIM 552. An additional investment, i.e. systems for
network monitoring equipment of kFIM 210 with a three-year pay-back period can be
recommended.  However, the expected reactive cost would not carry the investment where
proactive policy would require an additional management effort compared with the reactive
one. The additional preventive actions, costing kFIM 672 annually, could be covered only by
assuming that developer capacity is a sales-limiting facxtor.
Recommendations and sensitivity considerations can easily be provided for the day-to-day
decision-making of IT and SBU management, using the developed calculation models with
updated cost and failure statistics data. A key notion of the study is to develop a management
tool for NOKIA’s DP management.
Keywords: Investment planning, reliability, fault tolerance, DP management, management
policy.
31  Introduction
Investments in business oriented-information technology (IT) have in principle been justified
by business benefits exceeding costs. However, limited opportunities to quantify the real
benefits restrict the use of investment planning and control. The contradiction between urgent
need of economic evaluation of IT and the lack of relevant research findings has emphasised
research into IT investments as an essential part of IT management. Both the business value of
computers and IT investments as a whole have been studied systematically (Strassmann 1990
and 1997). The expenditure of firms for End User Computing (EUC),1 an expanding part of
IT, was expected to grow from 30% to an average of over 40% of total allocation in three
years, as already noted by Kwan and Curley (1989). Actually, the share increase of
PC/workstations, comparing the percentage of processing by hardware (HW) category, is
projected to increase by 75% by the end of the decade according to IS researchers (McLean et
al. 1993). The most critical change might be that the support cost of 28% is in the data centre
environment, but 77% in a distributed computing environment (Kirwin et al. 1995). This
challenge justifies the investment and cost minimisation approach in this study. This
exponential growth of distributed computing has been managed by organising End-user
Support, (EUS) typically in the form of a Help or Service Desk (HD/SD).
An HW reliability and maintainability problem which emerged while using EUC technology
is analysed in this study. From the end users’ point of view as a whole, by definition the EUC
context seems in practice to be the stand alone software (SW) products, such as word
processing and spreadsheets, as well as modern client/server applications, the last of which
typically require more support manpower and expertise than the traditional on-line applica-
tions (Keyes 1996). The organisational part of EUC management consists of strategy,
technology and management action, the last of which consists of support services and control
policies/procedures according to Brancheau and Brown (1993) among others. They found that
the EUC literature provides a wealth of descriptive data, but only a small number of theoreti-
cal frameworks. They suggest quantitative variables associated with outcome components
such as reliability and maintainability, which are discussed and analysed in this study.
Where a user has difficulties with some computer-based task, the loss of work time may be
excessive. Difficulties are often solved by trial and error and by learning or asking for
unofficial peer support. These productivity losses of personnel capacity are referred to as
hidden costs (Heikkilä 1995). Moreover, if the computer technology does not perform
properly, it leads to similar, but potentially more serious losses. For example, if a server for
some work group breaks down, the productivity of the whole group is compromised. Further,
if a Local Area Network (LAN) fails to work, it could affect the work of hundreds of people.
In some business areas, the systems may be directly linked to the customer interface, and thus
demand high quality, professional computing technology.
                                                          
1
 In this paper we apply the concept of “EUC” in the same sense as Panko (1988). Panko’s main interest has been
in phenomena like Post-DP revolution, Managerial and Professional Computing. He emphasised the
departmental aspect of EUC and the coverage of a large part of the staff.
4The risk of lost capacity can be compensated for by investing in technology and service,
thereby decreasing the probability of failure. However, some risks remain no matter how
proactive the investment approach is. To cover these remaining risks, reactive EUS is
required.
As against the verbal descriptions such as Brancheau and Brown (1993), empirical observa-
tions, failure risk modelling and quantitative planning are focused on in this study, the crux of
which is balancing between the proactive and reactive approaches.
Proactive and reactive management
The rapid development of IT has emphasised new HW and SW solutions, such as distributed
data processing (DDP) herein called distributed organisational computing (D-OC). Distributed
PCs are networked and linked to the common services through Local Area Networks (LANs).
Physical connection between the LAN and the PC is channelled through local communication
concentrators (HUB). Their job is to link the LAN backbone network and the user cabling.
Each HUB in the NOKIA HW configuration acts as a gate to the corporate network for 22–24
users. The corporate network provides most of the daily computing services needed by the
strategic business unit (C-SBU) in NOKIA Telecommunications Ltd. The HUBs link the
users to the centralised corporate databases and processing, external networks, Internet, etc.
(Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The local communication concentrator (HUB) in the NOKIA
local area network (LAN)
5Each HUB provides the physical gateway for a cluster of workstations to the corporate
network and common services. The number of such HUBs and clusters is in the order of a
hundred. The purpose of the HUB is to provide “media flexibility, increased port density,
integrated network security and bridging/switching options in departmental and remote
Ethernet LANs” (3Com 1995).
Applications have been re-designed to conform with the modern HW/SW frames, using
client/server techniques. Some researchers emphasise the end-users’ role in the development,
especially the acceptance of microcomputer technology (Igbaria 1993) or the learning and
diffusion processes of ‘learning-intensive technologies such as IT in general and PCs in
particular (Heikkilä 1995). Some studies focus on special features, such as the role of
antecedents in the process (Brown and Magill 1994).
In risk management one typically has conflicting goals and costs. The less preparations are
made in advance, the higher the “reactive” failure costs are, while reducing failure risk means
higher “proactive” preparation costs. This balancing follows the logic of insurance. A
simplified view of this trade-off between proactive and reactive costs has been published by
Grose (1987), and by Suominen (1994) and Berg (1994) (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. The optimum level of total costs compromises the estimated
accident losses (reactive) and the risk management costs of their
prevention (proactive)
6The downtime cost analysis focuses on cumulative potential savings rather than costs. The
cumulative potential saving S consists of four components
S = D P - Cp - Ca - Cr - Cm  . (1)
The productivity increase, D P, stands for the benefits and actual savings. The proactive costs,
Cp, of system robustness (e.g. redundancy) and administration (holding costs in the inventory-
production theory) represent the applied maintenance level in the spirit of a stationary
management policy and of the steady state economy. Conversely, the cost of actions, C
a
,
before potential failure (ordering costs) means exceptional operations such as orders,
emergency orders or replacement of critical parts before a potential failure. The reactive costs,
C
r
, are caused by a realised failure  (shortage costs in the inventory-production theory)2. The
management costs, C
m
, refer to those of EUS, IT, and strategic business unit (SBU) manage-
ment. An overview of the IS-managerial dimensions is shown in Figure 3. The main risk
shown in the diagram is the risk of losing business because IT fails to fulfil the requirements
of the business process. If requirements are met only partially, the IT problems cause a risk of
capacity losses. The reactive costs are incurred when these two risks materialise. Proactive
costs cover all those stationary cost items which reduce these risks. Action costs are due to
specific actions needed to cope with an alert, proactive or reactive (immediate risk or acute
problem). The productivity increase has not been measured here, because a pure cost
minimisation approach captures the essential features of the real problem.
The failure process and the reliability technique
The focus of the management model is the behaviour of the distributed HUBs (3COM
LInkBuilder FMS II of the LAN) (Figure 1). Where the HUB fails, most of the productive
work of all experts linked through it is impossible. The traditional reliability technique
concepts, such as mean time between failures (MTBF) and mean time to repair (MTTR), are
key concepts of the analysis. The MTBF is based on the properties of the HUB. It is (i) stated
beforehand by the vendor, termed the prior MTBF, and (ii) demonstrated by the empirical
evidence of the products in operational use in practice, termed the posterior MTBF.
The methodological approach of this study is that of inventory-service and risk modelling
based on the evaluation of stochastic failure processes, which in the end is founded on
observations in the field. The failure process model building relies on the discipline of
reliability systems, more precisely on the compound Poisson process, which assumes an
exponential failure law for each individual component. In fact, the exponential failure law has
already traditionally been a common planning assumption (Ross 1976). Moreover, empirical
studies have demonstrated that the exponential failure assumption fits the behaviour of
electronic components (Kaylan 1983).
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 The capacity losses of personnel in the case of failure of the network cause hidden costs (Heikkilä 1995) in the
sense that end users cannot work, which implies the cost impact remaining invisible and outside all cost
accounting procedures.
7The impact of proactive efforts on the failure process is difficult to estimate. For example,
statistics on traffic accidents occurring on old, dangerous railways are known in detail, but the
number of lives saved following the construction of new safety systems is nearly impossible
to assess. This dilemma of the proactive approach with respect to costs, risks and measure-
ment in the society has been rigorously analysed by Keeney (1995).
The benefits and costs in the evaluation of the failure process
Loosely speaking, the problem definition of the management task in question consists of two
parts: failure process analysis without any economic evaluation, and the management model
formulation based on the evaluation of the process with the help of benefit and cost parame-
ters. The evaluation links the risk and the benefit/cost parameters.
The concepts used for the DP management task (Formula (1)) are of the traditional produc-
tion-inventory theory type, which recognises holding (proactive), shortage (reactive),
replenishment/production costs (action) and management costs (Naddor 1966).
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Figure 3. Risks and budget can be balanced by investing in the
technology and enhancing the support service
The benefits are available only whenever the HUB is working properly. The potential increase
in productivity, D P, however, is not included. The reactive costs, C
r
, are considered in the case
of failure of the HUB. The costs of proactive measures Cp, such as change of parts before they
fail, additional maintenance, etc. are estimated in detail. The cost of actions, C
a
, before
potential failure are caused by exceptional operations, primarily sporadic non-systematic, such
as replacement of critical parts before potential failure.
8The notion of the study
This study relies on earlier contributions and a comprehensive case study using empirical data
from NOKIA Corporation, in order to develop a novel model for managerial decision-making.
The problem of this study is to determine a balance between the proactive and reactive
approaches, based on the following steps: the reliability theory model for the risk quantifica-
tion will be constructed and estimated. The cost parameters will be estimated. The manage-
ment model will be constructed in order to combine the risk and costs and results and
recommendations for IT and SBU management are provided.
2  Previous work
Reliability theory offers concepts such as the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and
techniques for quantitative analysis needed for planning, e.g. the preventive server mainte-
nance above (Welch 1997). Empirical studies have shown that the MTBF of electronic
components typically follows an exponential law as demonstrated by Kaylan (1983). The
demand of, say, electronic spare parts over a period of time then follows the Poisson
distribution.
This study belongs to the area of Multi-Echelon Repairable Inventory Control (METRIC)
(Abboud 1996), but the model is less complex. A similar management problem to that in this
study has been analysed by Koskela (1993), who studied the spare parts of NOKIA assuming
a constant failure intensity l  = 1/MTBF. If the failure intensity l  of a technical component
varies according to the gamma distribution among components of the same type, the demand
follows a negative binomial distribution (Kendall and Stuart 1977). The existence of
probability laws for the risk behaviour itself allows the application of Bayesian methodology
instead of standard statistical methods. In this case both the tests and estimates are based on
the so-called posterior distributions as described by Box and Tiao (1992).
Note that even non-homogenous Poisson processes with a time-varying failure intensity l  =
l (t) can be estimated as shown by Lenk and Rao (1995). However, the empirical data here is
sufficient only for homogenous models. A technique called parameter maps for combining
sequential estimations, and even a prior parameter, with the Bayesian Poisson demand has
been suggested by Buck et al. (1995) and applied here. Moreover, if the prior distribution of
the failure intensity l , or at least its mean and standard deviation, could be provided by the
vendor, the two stages of Bayesian reliability tests with empirical technology observations
and the corresponding posterior distributions based on the use of both prior and posterior data,
could be estimated together (Whitmore et al. 1994), which has been done in this study.
Basic features of end-user computing (EUC) have been described by Brancheau and Brown
(1993), and studied in the Finnish context by Heikkilä (1995). The concept of proactivity is
often used in the context of EUS. However, there seem to be only a few previous research
findings available. General risk management (Berg 1994; Suominen 1994) is one framework
9within which to study proactivity from the economic perspective. Keeney (1995) has analysed
the consequences of proactive and reactive policies respectively. He emphasises the difficulty
in estimating profits, even a saved life, as the consequence of proactive investments. Risk
management is defined as:
“Risk management is a holistic view of the existing risks and a systematic study of the options
how to minimise their effects followed by the selection and implementation of the most
efficient actions identified in that study” (Berg 1994).
Bruton (1995) describes proactivity as “regular study of user problems encountered with a
view to preventing them in future”. This may also be achieved by “creation of an inventory of
user equipment to help with diagnosing and solving problems the users may have”.
Bruton gives a list of specific services to maintain proactivity:
• formalised analysis of the previous fortnight’s Help Desk queries and focusing on the
most frequent problems
• producing and delivering reports on changes made to the computer network
• compiling and maintaining a directory and regular report on computer usage and in-
vestment feasibility
• maintaining a register of equipment
• keeping a central catalogue of technical objects
• producing monthly newsletters
• monitoring the learning of new company employees
• analysing new technologies and preparing their deployment.
 
 Proactivity is analysed by Welch (1997) in the context of network management. He concludes
that “solving problems under pressure is never a good idea and doing so can lead to more
serious problems down the road. Finding and solving problems before users notice them
should be paramount to any network manager. Proactive management can dramatically reduce
your support loads because you deal with a problem once rather than for each user”.
 
 The main steps for proactivity in a network management context include (Welch 1997):
• educating users
• preventive server maintenance
• separating test and production environments (servers and network components)
• standardising device names
• carefully planning and testing all system changes.
The definition of Distributed Organisational Computing (D-OC) is refined from Forsman
(1997): D-OC is organization-wide, task-related computing, which is based on coopera-
tively managed distributed services and resources. This study as well as Forsman (1997)
has connections with the action research tradition (Kerola and Reponen 1996; Stringer 1996).
There is a strong tradition of basic IT investment guides (Karvinen et al. 1994), which use
some concepts of this study, typically without any systematic observation and quantitative
analysis. However, observations, failure process and management modelling form quantitative
cornerstones here.
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3 Material and Methods
3.1  The demand process of one ventilator
Some studies make the straightforward assumption that the demand for electronic components
follows a Poisson distribution. Koskela (1993), for example, studied the demand for spare
parts in the Nokia Telecommunications Customer Support Centre. Actually, the fundamental
empirical finding, shown already by Drenick (1960), is that one electronic component has not  
failed after time t with a probability of F(t) = exp(-l t) called the survivor function of the
exponential distribution. The parameter l  is the mean failure rate l  = 1/MTBF and MTBF is
the mean time between failures of the component. Note that the MTBF of the HUB ventilator
was, according to the vendor, roughly 2 years and two months.
If the failure rate is exponential with intensity l , which is assumed to be both constant over
time and the same among different ventilators, the demand during a time period t forms a
Poisson process. The probability { }Pr n  that exactly n replacement units will be needed
during  t  for one ventilator place in one HUB is then
{ }Pr n  =  exp(- t) ( t) / n! nl l . (2)
Note that both the mean m  and the variance s 2 of the Poisson distribution above is l t, m  = s 2 =
l t. When assuming a Poisson distribution, only one figure, MTBF, is sufficient information
because the shape of the distribution, including the variance, is frozen by the one parameter m
independently of the empirical data. Recall that the amount n can be interpreted as the number
of arrivals (replacements) of a renewal process with exponential inter-arrival (replacement)
times (Feller 1971).
The ventilator is assumed here to have a constant failure rate over time l , and this has been
found to be sufficient in practice, especially when analysing the need for many electronic
devices. The process is then called homogeneous. However, the analysis and application of
even heterogeneous Poisson processes with l  = l (t) can be performed and parameters
estimated (Lenk and Rao 1995). Unfortunately, the estimation of heterogeneous Poisson
processes requires amounts of data obtained, e.g. from traffic control. When IT management
problems are investigated the limited number of observations typically forces the homogene-
ity assumption. In this study, the failure rate does not vary in time, but both the deterministic
rate case with the same l  in the ventilator population and the stochastic rate case of the
random l  over the population are analysed.  
3.2  The prior vendor MTBFs and the observed failures
The calculations use both the vendor announced prior MTBF and the posterior empirical
evidence of  the NOKIA corporation, in order to obtain failure distributions. The vendor was
not able to provide distribution information other than the two MTBFs (mean time between
failures), one at the beginning 19,272 hours, roughly 2 years 2 months, and subsequently an
11
improved version, 63,265 hours, roughly 7 years 2 months. The corresponding failure rates
are l 1 = 1/26.3 month
-1
 and l 2 = 1/86.4 month
-1
. Unfortunately, no information on the shape of
the prior distribution of the parameter l  was given by the vendor. This limitation in the
information supports the assumption that l  does not vary from box to box among the 280
ventilators in the field.
The observation period was from 5/1995 to 9/1996 on Campus B and Campus C, on average 9
months, and from 11/1995 to 8/1996 on Campus A 5/1995, but on average from 3/1996 to
10/1996 i.e. 7 months on Campus A. Thus the average duration of the observation time was 8
months.
The failures of the HUB ventilators, two  in each HUB, were as follows:
Table 1. The ventilator failures on NOKIA campuses
Campus B Campus C Campus A All
HUBs with one ventilator broken 20 26 3 49
HUBs with both ventilators broken 3 8 3 14
Number of ventilators broken in all 26 42 9 77
Number of ventilators installed 160 74 46 280
Failure rate in percentages 16.3 56.8 19.6 27.5
In all, there were 140 HUBs, with altogether 280 ventilators, of which 77 or 27.5% were
broken  during the observation period of 8 months.3 On the assumption of a constant failure
rate, parameter l  would provide the mean of m 1 = 1/3.29, which equals the failure probability
of 30.4%, and m 2 = 1/10.8, which equals the failure probability of 9.3%, during the 8 months
corresponding to MTBFs of 19,272 hours and 63,265 hours respectively.
Surprisingly, the original (first) vendor rate is even higher than the observed failure (hit) rate
of 27.5%. By contrast, the revised (second) vendor rate differs essentially from the empirical
evidence.
3.3  The Bayesian posterior failure rate distribution and its fit with the prior
vendor MTBFs
First, it is assumed that the failure rate does not vary from ventilator to ventilator, so that the
prior demand of each ventilator follows the Poisson distribution. Consider a set of 280
independent test benches of  ventilators. On each test bench there is a Poisson (renewal)
                                                          
3
 On Campus B 160 units in 80 HUBs have been changed, of which 20 had one broken ventilator. Three HUBs
had both ventilators broken. On Campus C 74 units of 37 HUBs were changed of which 26 had one broken unit
and 8 both units broken. On Campus A 46 units of 23 HUBS were changed of which 3 had one and 3 both
ventilators broken.
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process (Formula (2)), which requires 0, 1, 2, .. replacements. The empirical frequencies F =
(f1,f2,...,f280) are either zero, one or two or… as noted in Table 1 above.
The random number of failures  m   then has the Bayesian posterior distribution, given by  
the failure frequency observations vector F (Box and Tiao 1992, p. 40)
( ) [ ] [ ]p F  exp(-v ) v  (f.+1 / 2 ,(f. 1 / 2) -(f.+1 / 2) 1m m m= - -G (3)
where the number v of independent frequencies is 280, the sum f. of the failure frequencies is
77, G (× ) is the gamma function and m  > 0. Note that the confidence intervals of m  can be
calculated directly from the distribution (3). The posterior distribution (3) above is that of m .  
Actually, v m  is distributed as 0.5 À 2 (chi-square/2) with 2f.+1 = 155 degrees of freedom  
where f. = 77 is the number of failures. Thus the maximum likely estimate of the posterior
distribution mean m  of (3) equals the number of failures modified by 0.5 and then divided by  
the number of ventilators (f. + 1/2)/v = (77+0.5)/280 = 27.7% (Box and Tiao 1992).
The fitness of the vendor information against the empirical evidence is tested by applying the
derived Bayesian posterior distribution (3). The vendor MTBF of 19,272 hours over 8 months
refers to m  = 0.304 and to 85 failures on average, and their MTBF of 63,265 hours to m  =
0.0926 and to 26 failures on average. The posterior distribution of vm  above can also be used
to test the fitness of the first and the second vendor MTBFs with the empirical observations.
For the first MTBF, the probability Pr {0.5 À 2155 < 85 } = Pr { À 2155 < 170 } > 10%. Thus the
hypothesis that the first vendor MTBF fits the observations cannot be rejected. By contrast,
the hypothesis is rejected at a risk of < 0.1% with the second vendor MTBF. In all, the
observations fit the first MTBF and deviate completely from the second (revised) one.
3.4  Combining the prior MTBFs and observation sets
Second, the random failure rate l , and its point estimate for the constant rate l , will be  
analysed. Recall that the failure rate was, until now, assumed to be both constant in time and
the same among numerous ventilators. Here there are 280 electronic components - the same
type of ventilator in various servers (HUBs) in the C-SBU of NOKIA. Each of the compo-
nents has a demand process of Poisson type but with its own specific failure rate of l  =
1/MTBF parameter. Although the demand of one individual ventilator follows the Poisson
process (2) its parameter l  varies over the whole population according to some distribution.
Consider the random failure rate l  from the Bayesian viewpoint. In the context of Bayesian  
estimation the concept of natural conjugate distributions (NCDs) emerges. The NCDs possess
the property that the prior and the posterior distributions of l  have the same functional form.  
The NCD for the rate parameter l  of the Poisson process is the gamma distribution (Buck et
al. 1995), the density function of which is
( )g n, t =  t  exp(- t) / (n)  for 0,(n-1) nl l l lG ‡ (4)
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where G (× ) is the gamma function, n ‡  0 stands for the number of observed events and t ‡  0 for
the time units for observing.4
Now only the two different MTBFs of 19,272 and 63,265 hours are provided a priori by the
vendor. The prior expected number of failures n0 during the t0 = 8 month observation period
would then be n0 = 85 and = 26 respectively.
Using the eight month time interval t0 = 8 and the artificially constructed initial prior points n0
= 85 and = 26 respectively on the parameter mapping (Buck et al. 1995) the posterior
expectation and the variance of l  is  
E ( n + n ) / (t + t )0 1 0 1l ) (= (5.1)
and
V( (n +  n ) / (t + t )0 1 0 1 2l ) .= (5.2)
The number of observed failures was n1 = 77 and the observation time t1 = 8 months. The
expectation E(l ) would suggest the expected  number of failures of 81  when combining the
first constructed initial point (n0 = 81) and the observations. However, when combining the
second point (n0 = 26) and the observations, only 52 failures could be expected.
In all, the expected number of failures at the posterior rate would mean 81 failures instead of
85, and 52 instead of 26 respectively, using the two vendor MTBFs in the initial point
estimation. The empirical evidence again supports the former MTBF of the vendor and is
against the latter. The parameter mapping is actually aimed at combining sequential observa-
tion data sets, say, from different campuses of NOKIA. Using the failure rate expectation E(l )  
and variance V(l ), modification formulas above the distribution (4) of the failure rate l   can  
be easily updated and tuned for management purposes applying formulas (5.1) and (5.2).
3.5  The Bayesian posterior distribution of the whole NOKIA SBU demand for
parameter estimation
Third, the mean number of failures m  of the Poisson process (Formula (2)) has previously
been constant – using the case of one ventilator, but from now on a random variable m  - using  
the case of the whole ventilator population. The random m  is assumed to follow the gamma  
distribution (Formula (4)). The total "summarised" demand in the whole C-SBU caused by all
                                                          
4
 Supposing that the renewal process of each individual ventilator exhibited an exponential distribution Exp(l ),
the sum of those mutually independent random variables of v ventilators has the distribution of Gamma form with
the density function
 (v)t)/(exp(-  t = )g( v1-v Glll (Feller 1971).         (4’)
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the ventilators, each of which is assumed to form a Poisson process, then follows a negative
binomial (also called Pascal) distribution (Kendall and Stuart 1977)
(cf. also Lenk and Rao 1995).
{ }Pr v  ventilators and  f  failures v -1
f -1
(1- p) , for v =  f,  f +1,  f + 2,f v-f= æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
p … (6)
where 0 < p  < 1 is the failure probability and v is the number of ventilators, say 280, and f is
the number of failures, say 77. Note that (6) can be interpreted as the probability distribution
in which “sample” size v is required to achieve the f:th failure. The negative binomial
distribution (6) is applied to the empirical data of NOKIA Corporation and in the Bayesian
framework.
If the demand distribution is binomial then the Bayesian posterior distribution ( )p fp  of the
failure probability p  is the Beta distribution  
( ) { },1/2)+f-(v1/2)+(f1)/+v()-(1 fp 1/2)-f-(v1/2)-(f GGG= ppp (7)
where G (v+1) is the gamma function and equals v! with integers (Box and Taio 1992). The
posterior mean of the failure probability during the 8 months is E( p ) = (f+1/2)/(v+1) =  
77.5/281 = 27.6% and the variance V( p ) = (f+1/2)(v-f+1/2)/{(v+2)(v+1)2} (Kendall and Stuart  
1977), the latter giving the standard deviation of 2.7%.
In all, the failure risk during an 8 month period follows a Beta distribution (7) with these
results when applying (i) the empirical data, (ii) the Poisson process of each ventilator
demand (iii) the gamma distribution of the failure rate parameter (iv) compounding the
Poisson process and the gamma distribution, and (v) applying the Bayesian methodology in
the whole NOKIA SBU. Recall that the original MTBF of 19,272 hours is surprisingly close
to the mean above, but the hypothesis that the revised MTBF of 63,265 hours fits the
empirical evidence can be rejected using the Beta distribution above with a risk of less than
0.1%. The failure risk distribution is subsequently assumed to follow the Beta distribution (7)
with the estimated parameters above, mean of 27.6% and the standard deviation of 2.7%. This
result even enables the distribution of the reactive cost C
 
of (1).
3.6  From one ventilator’s failure process to the whole NOKIA failure process
Fourth, the HUB failure process of the whole NOKIA SBU will be analysed. Note that the
Beta distribution (7) above is that of the failure of any single ventilator. Since each HUB has
two ventilators, the service is disrupted only if both of them fail. This means the multiplica-
tion of random variables, both of which possess the same Beta distribution above. The
multiplication of random variables with Beta distributions is analytically possible only in
some special cases (Kendall and Stuart 1977, p. 287).
Here the mixture of binomials is applied (Kendall and Stuart 1977, p. 157). The failure
parameter p  of both ventilators of a HUB are then distributed in the same Beta form and the
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failure process of the HUB is a binomial distribution with p  the parameter. Now any single
HUB with two ventilators is considered. The probability of 0, 1, 2 ventilator failures is that of
a Beta-binomial distribution (Kendall and Stuart 1977, p. 157)
{ } { }
{ },0.5)+f-v0.5,+B(f x)-1,3+B(x 3                                                               
x)/-2.5+f-vx,+0.5+B(f = xPr =  fail HUB  theof orsx ventilatPr (8)
where x = 0, 1, 2 and B(× ,× )is the beta function. It can be expressed in terms of the gamma
function B(a,b) = G (a) G  (b) / G (a+b). Here, the only relevant combination is the failure of
both ventilators and therefore of the HUB. The probability of this specific combination of two
failures, x = 2, is
{ } { }0.5+f-v0.5,+B(f B(3,1) 30.5)/+f-v2.5,+B(f = P =  fails HUB thePr h  (8’).
Using the case figures v = 280 ventilators and f = 77 failures one obtains the probability of the
failure of one HUB as (79 78)/(283 282) = 7.7% .
The failure process of the whole HUB population can be described by the binomial distribu-
tion in which the failure probability of each HUB is  Ph, here 7.7%, and there are h HUBs
altogether  x  of which will fail. Therewith the number of failures distribution is of the
binomial form:
{ }Pr x  HUBs of  h  fail  =  h
x
P (1- P )  ,hx h h-x
æ
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÷
(9)
with mean E(x) = h Ph and variance V(x) = h Ph (1-Ph). In this special case with h = 140 and
Ph = 7.7%, the general formula (9) results in
{ } x-140xxh 0.9230.077
x
140
  = P =0.077 =Pfail  140  of HUBsx  Pr
÷
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ł
ö
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 (9’)
with mean E(x) = 10.78 and variance  V(x) = 9.95 ventilators, the standard deviation thus
being 3.15 HUBs.
3.7  The reactive cost of down time
An evaluation of the failure risk distribution estimated using the empirical evidence is the key
to management decision-making and optimisation. A monetary evaluation is often used as the
most important measurement, and sometimes the only one, although it should not be the only
criterion. Here costs caused by failures are considered. The cost of down time is the proxy of
the reactive costs C
r
. It is defined on the annual basis, FIM/year, as a kind of shortage cost by:
C
r
 = F * {N * Bd * MTTR + Bm * RW + 2 * V} * 12 months (10)
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F = number of network HUB disruptions (failures) per month
N = number of developers behind one HUB
Bd = burden rate per developer per hour
MTTR = duration of network disruption hours (mean time to repair)
B
m
 = burden rate per maintenance and repair expert per hour
RW = maintenance and repair work required to fix or change the HUB
V = the price of one ventilator.
Recall that the number F of disruptions per month is a random variable. The mean of F during
an 8 month period is 10.78 HUB failures, and the corresponding standard deviation is 3.15
HUB failures. Note that the other figures in Formula (10) are assumed to be constant.
A HUB has 24 ports, and there are typically 22–24 PCs linked to it. Some equipment has only
12 ports, especially in the Campus A unit. In all, calculations are based on the estimate N = 24
developers behind each HUB. Burden rate Bd describes the contribution of a developer, which
is obtained from the cost accounting systems at Bd = FIM 350/hour. If the missed opportuni-
ties of developers indicate an alternative burden rate for sales, then the turnover divided by the
number of personnel and by working hours suggest the burden rate Bd’ = FIM 750/hour.
The MTTR, the duration of network disruptions, varies from hours to half a day, the last of
which is used as the estimate, MTTR = ½ a day = 4 hours. Although MTTR is actually also a
random variable, its variation is so small that it can be considered as constant.
The burden rate of the repair person, B
m
 = FIM 300 / hour, comes from the cost accounting
system. The repair work typically lasts less working hours than the whole out-of-service time
of the network and is estimated to be RW = 2 hours. The price of a ventilator is FIM 300.
When a HUB fails both ventilators are broken, i.e. two units are needed.
In all, the cost of one failure is FIM 34,800, with the burden rate based on a sales-limiting
effect of FIM 73,200. The reactive costs of down time is on average FIM 562,716 with a
sales-based burden rate of FIM 1,183,644 annually. Note that the interval: mean +/- the
standard deviation is (FIM 398,286 and FIM 727,146) and with +/- two standard deviations
(FIM 233,856 and FIM 891,576) annually. Whenever the sales-based burden rate is accepted
the corresponding intervals are with +/- one standard deviation (FIM 837,774 and FIM
1,529,514) and with +/- two standard deviations (491,904 and 1,875,384).
Recall that the empirical observations confirm the original MTBF of the vendor, 19,272
hours. These results can be considered pessimistic supposing that the vendor’s new revised
MTBF of 63,265 hours holds instead of the original.
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3.8  The proactive and management costs
The proactive cost Cp consist of several types of system administration activities, such as (i)
system and service monitoring, (ii) network monitoring, and (iii) preventive corrective actions
before troubles appear for the users (called troubleshooting). In NOKIA neither (iv) system
backups nor (v) disk space management are affected by the HUB risk consideration. In all, the
annual proactive costs, FIM/year, for the whole network management can be calculated as a
kind of holding cost using the formula:
Cp = Ba * ( SM + NM + TS)* 46 weeks (11)
B
a
 = burden rate per system administrator per hour
SM = hours per week spent on system and service monitoring
NM = hours per week spent on network monitoring
TS = hours per week spent on troubleshooting.
The burden rate is, according to the cost control, FIM 300/hour. The corresponding weekly
hours altogether in the three business units of NOKIA, are SM = 15, NM = 15 and TS = 10.
The weekly proactive cost is FIM 12,000, and the yearly cost Cp = FIM 552,000.
The proxy of management cost C
m
 includes system investment for service and network
monitoring. This cost is based on investment calculation for three years. One system (210,000
FIM) costs FIM 70,000 annually. It provides proactive monitoring for 500–1000 end-users.
Note that the pros and cons of automated systems have been discussed by Welch (1997)
among others.
3.9  The cost of ad hoc actions
The additional preventive actions of network management in NOKIA nowadays consist of
general network monitoring such as focused fault anticipation and preventive maintenance
actions before potential failure, including preventive maintenance work. The cost component
for actions C
a
 related to and allocated to the HUBs are calculated on a monthly basis
 C
a
 = HUB * ( NM + FA + SP + PW * POW) (12)
HUB = the number of HUBs
NM = general network monitoring FIM /HUB
FA = focused fault anticipation FIM /HUB
SP = spares and other maintenance facilities FIM / HUB
PW = preventive work hours /HUB
POW = price of the preventive work.
The number of HUBs is 140. The general network monitoring, according to the cost control,
is NM = 150 FIM/HUB, focused fault anticipation FA = 50 FIM/HUB, spares SP = 50
FIM/HUB, preventive work required after diagnosis is PW = ½ hour, and PW = 300
FIM/hour.
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The monthly action cost C
a
 total FIM 56,000, and annually FIM 672,000, exceeding the
annual proactive cost Cp and the expected reactive cost Cr of the base burden rate case by
more than FIM 100,000, but remain below the expected reactive cost of the sales-based
burden rate case by more than FIM 500,000.
4  Management policies, IT investments and the factors affected
The reactive, proactive, management and action cost components have been aggregated on an
annual basis in each case. Different policies provide their summarised, related annual cost
figures. The key requirement is to analyse the total cost as a function of the various back-
ground factors affecting the service (cf. Figure 1) applying the ceteris paribus rule, i.e. only
one variable is considered at a time.
The basic proactive costs remain constant, with each management policy being kFIM 552 in
size in accordance with the traditional NOKIA policy. However, if ad hoc preventive actions
have been taken in advance in NOKIA to find and fix possible problems, then the  action costs
would charge the HUBs at an annual kFIM 672.
In contrast to the deterministic proactive and action costs, the stochastic reactive costs vary
according to the risk distribution, which is built on the demand processes of electronic
components, Bayesian estimation techniques, and on the empirical failure findings of
NOKIA’s three business units. The expected reactive costs would be kFIM 563 if the cost-
accounting-based developer’s burden rate is applied, and kFIM 1184 if a burden rate affecting
sales is used. The standard deviation is kFIM 165 or as much as kFIM 346 if the burden rate
affects the sales.
Comparing reactive and proactive costs, it turns out that the proactive management policy
would save money.  If a sales-based burden rate is used the costs would cover even  system-
atic additional preventive actions such as semi-annual action. Moreover, the reactive costs
could also then cover service and network monitoring investment of kFIM 210. Where only
the salary costs of the burden rate are recognised, the investment could be considered, but
only if the systematic preventive maintenance actions could be ignored.
Recall that the reactive costs  C
r
  are random. Their distribution has an interval of mean +/- the
standard deviation (kFIM 398 and kFIM 727) and mean  +/- two standard deviations  (kFIM
234 and kFIM 892) at the annual level using the cost-accounting-based developer burden rate.
If the developer burden rate affecting sales is accepted, the corresponding intervals are  (kFIM
838 and kFIM 1530) and (kFIM 492 and kFIM 1875). The mean of the reactive costs was
kFIM 563 in the former burden rate case, and kFIM 1183 in the latter, and the proactive costs
kFIM 552. This suggests that a management monitoring investment of kFIM 70 could be
considered with the lower burden rate if the mean reactive costs are accepted for decision-
making. However, the additional preventive actions, with costs  C = kFIM 672,  could wait
until additional empirical evidence can be obtained from the failures, preferably with different
policies in different business units (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Proactive as against reactive costs
Alternative calculations, with an optimistic revised MTBF of 63,265 hours, are against the
monitoring investments. However the original MTBF of 19,272 hours of the vendor is nearly
in balance with the empirical failure observations. In all, the economic calculations show that
proactive and reactive costs are quite well balanced, supporting even the management
monitoring investment, but additive preventive actions  are not yet justifiable.
Suppose that SBU and IT management costs were estimated separately for both proactive and
reactive policies. Although failures cause management involvement and even crises, one
might assume that a proactive policy would necessitate  kFIM 50-100 more management cost
than the reactive one, which would be seen as the upper limit of cost difference. Even these
costs could be covered by the difference between the proactive and the  expected reactive
costs, but the management monitoring investment would then be questioned.
5  Conclusions and recommendations
The IT investment and factors influencing it were investigated considering both proactive and
reactive costs, as well as the influence of additional preventive actions and purchase of a
management monitoring device. The essential empirical data was obtained from the failure
statistics of three business units of NOKIA Corporation. The real case was managed proac-
tively, however, and the potential losses in productivity could be avoided
The cost of proactivity was small compared to the potential loss caused by reactive policy.
When using the developer’s burden rate based on sales impact especially,  the costs of  annual
failures were intolerably high. The reactive approach would have caused considerable
productivity losses and damage to the business and user satisfaction. Fortunately, the threat
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was identified in this case; surprisingly though, not as a result of systematic LAN monitoring,
but by IS management. Recall that proactivity has even been studied as a personality property
(Crant 1996), which might be of help in managing IS departments.
It has been stated that ‘all end-user costs must be identifiable, comparable and assigned
directly to the departmental projects or personnel who "drive" the costs' (Hoshower and
Verstraete 1989).   Moreover, 'today's information service marketplace requires unbiased
appraisals of the cost and risk associated with various technologies, and accurate assessment
of current operational costs.' The IS management is facing difficulties in allocating reactive
costs after failures, but might be authorised to allocate proactive costs to the end-users in the
context of the firm’s accounting procedure.
The analysis also emphasises the selective role of proactivity, which should be focused on the
areas of the main potential loss. The analysis additionally shows that there is room for
management to monitor investments. In practice, investments could be considered only after
the HUB management policy was tuned and more failure statistics and cost information
gathered.
Recall the maturity stages: start-up (initial nine months), mid-life (nil to 24 months) and
maturity (more than 24 months) suggested by Hecht (1994), which contains the notion of a
learning process.  The   results can be generalised in the form that comprehensive problem
analysis for finding the root cause is an economical tool both for proactivity and investment
planning.
For a practitioner our work reveals the risks of the networked computing environment and the
managerial options for making reactive and proactive choices. Our analysis makes the point
that significant proactive measures are justified for isolating the business from technical risks.
It also becomes clear that active management is required to identify the potential risks in a
rapidly changing, complex technical environment.
Summary
This paper has used LAN availability as a case for analysing the balance and differences
between reactive and proactive end-user support. The productivity of a knowledge worker
depends heavily on the availability of LANs. Lower LAN availability hurts the productivity
of the end-users of NOKIA, most of whom are high-level  SW development specialists.
Our case material shows that the failure of a LAN component (HUB) caused a decrease in
productivity of 34,800 FIM when a cost-accounting-based development specialist hourly cost
is applied. If the developer’s inability to work affected sales, the cost of the failure would be
FIM 73,200. The failure process of the HUBs was analysed using three different approaches.
However, all of them were based on the same known empirical failure behaviour of HUBs,  as
well as on the so-called posterior Bayesian test and estimation methodology.
21
The annual reactive cost distribution was estimated at a mean of kFIM 562 and standard
deviation of  kFIM 164 with cost-accounting-based hourly developer cost, and kFIM  1184
and kFIM 346 respectively, with a sales-limitation-based hourly developer cost. The proactive
cost components were analysed both in the basic case and with ad hoc preventive maintenance
actions before potential failure. The cost of the proactive basic case was  kFIM 552 and that of
the  additional preventive maintenance actions  kFIM 672.
We have analysed the justification for proactive LAN management on the basis of different
cost components and options. The conclusion is that proactive support management results in
better user productivity and can be considered a sound focus for resources. Moreover,
investing HW for network management,  such as systems for service and network monitoring
(kFIM 210), could be considered when expected reactive costs only are recognised. The pay-
back period would then be roughly three years. However, preventive maintenance actions
before a potential failure should not be carried out before more precise hourly developer costs
and additional empirical failure statistics become available.
In all, the optimal management policy is as follows: a careful proactive policy and fault cause
recognition and cost estimate update should be implemented. If the sales limitation hourly
developer cost is accepted,  even the cost of systematic preventive maintenance actions, e.g.
semi-annual action before potential failure are covered by the potential cost caused by the
failures with less proactive effort. Moreover, additional ventilators and even an additional
HUB in each of the three NOKIA units could be considered as decreasing the mean time to
repair (MTTR).  Additionally, the  network monitoring investment with a three-year pay-back
period can be justified by the expected reactive costs where no additional preventive actions
are taken.
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